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The Applicant Violator System Under

SMCRA: Ownership and Control
Regulations
CHAUNCEY S. R. CURTZ*
KAREN J. GREENWELL**

INTRODUCTION

Thirteen years ago, Congress enacted the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977' (SMCRA). Among its
purposes was to protect the environment from adverse effects
of surface coal mining operations. 2 SMCRA contains comprehensive regulations governing the permitting3 and environmental
performance standards 4 for surface mining operations as well as
extensive enforcement provisions. These enforcement measures
7
6
include notices of violation,5 cessation orders, civil penalties
and the withholding of permits.'
The focus of this Article is 30 U.S.C. § 1260(c), § 522 of
SMCRA, which prohibits the issuance of a permit in two broad
categories of circumstances. First, permit issuance is forbidden

Partner, Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, Lexington, Kentucky. B.S., 1976, McGill
University, Canada; J.D., 1981, University of Wisconsin.
** Senior Associate, Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, Lexington, Kentucky. B.A., 1976,
J.D., 1985, University of Kentucky. The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance
of Lori C. Hudson, Associate, Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs. The opinions expressed in this
article are those of the authors.
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 [hereinafter cited as
SMCRAJ, Pub. L. No. 95-87, § 522, 91 Stat. 445 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328)
(Supp. 111 1979).
SMCRA § 102 (a) and (d), 30 U.S.C. § 1202(a) and (d).
SMCRA §§ 506-514, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1256-1264.
4 SMCRA §§ 515-516, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1265-1266.
I SMCRA § 521, 30 U.S.C. § 1271.
6 Id.
SMCRA § 518, 30 U.S.C. §d 1268.
SMCRA § 522, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1211(c) and 1260(c) authorize the regulatory
authority to withhold a surface coal mining and reclamation permit; 30 U.S.C. §
1253(a)(7) requires each state regulatory program to be consistent with the federal
regulations found in 30 C.F.R. §§ 773.5 and 773.15.
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where any surface coal mining operation "owned" or "controlled" by the applicant is currently in violation of the Act. 9
The Act also prohibits the issuance of a permit upon a determination that the applicant controls or has controlled mining
operations with a demonstrated pattern of willful violations of
the Act resulting in irreparable damage to the environment. 0
The prohibition against the issuance of permits under these
conditions is mandatory.
Pursuant to 30 U.S.C. §1211(c)(2), the Secretary of the Interior promulgated regulations to implement these permit-blocking enforcement provisions." Nevertheless, some violators
managed to escape detection and obtain new permits.

I.

THE APPLICANT VIOLATOR SYSTEM

In Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Watt 12 two
environmental groups 3 filed suit to compel the Office of Surface
Mining (OSM) to use its enforcement powers as required by
SMCRA to prevent violators from obtaining permits. Despite
OSM's use of cessation orders and civil penalties, violations of
SMCRA had continued to go unabated. 4 One frequently used
method for avoiding SMCRA's permit-blocking provisions was
the formation of new corporations, partnerships or other business entities by individuals with unabated violations. Through

SMCRA § 522, 30 U.S.C. § 1260(c) reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
Where the schedule or other information available to the regulatory authority indicates that any surface coal mining operation owned or controlled
by the applicant is currently in violation of this chapter or such other laws
referred to [in] this subsection, the permit shall not be issued until the
applicant submits proof that such violation has been corrected or is in the
process of being corrected to the satisfaction of the regulatory authority,
department, or agency which has jurisdiction over such violation and no
permit shall be issued to an applicant after a finding by the regulatory
authority, after opportunity for hearing, that the applicant, or the operator
specified in the application, controls or has controlled mining operations
with a demonstrated pattern of willful violations of this chapter of such
nature and duration with such resulting irreparable damage to the environment as to indicate an intent not to comply with the provisions of this
chapter.
10

Id.

1 30 C.F.R.
"

773.
550 F. Supp. 979 (D.D.C. 1982).
Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. and the Council of Southern Mountains,

Inc.
See 53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 (1988).
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these new entities, violators were obtaining permits as new operators. Without an adequate system to track the identities of
these violators, it was difficult for OSM to determine who should
be permit-blocked as required by the Act. 5
In Save Our CumberlandMountains, the court ordered OSM
to comply with its regulations requiring denial of a permit where
a violation and failure to abate existed.16 With an appeal of the
court's order pending, the respective parties negotiated a settlement which led to the entry of a consent decree known as the
"Amended Parker Order.' ' 7 The Applicant Violator System
(AVS) was established as a requirement of the Amended Parker
Order.
Under the Order, OSM agreed to establish and maintain a
computerized system containing the identity of:
(a) all permanent program permit applicants and permittees;
(b) all persons who own or control such applicants or permittees;
(c) all entities including corporations, partnerships and individuals which are responsible for unabated cessation
orders issued by OSM during the interim or permanent
programs;
(d) all persons who own or control such entities;
(e) all entities which have failed to pay any penalty imposed
by OSM in either the interim or permanent programs;
and
(f) all persons who own or control such entities. 8
The computerized AVS was established to enable OSM to effectively identify and track violators to enforce the permit-blocking
provisions of the Act.' 9
The Order further required OSM to use the AVS to determine at least quarterly if any person in control of a permit
applicant is or was in control of an entity with an unabated
cessation order or unpaid penalty subject to the Order.2 If OSM

I d.

'6Save Our Cumberland Mountains, 550 F. Supp. at 979.
11Save Our Cumberland Mountains v. Clark, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1217
(D.D.C. 1985). This Amended Order replaced an earlier, less detailed order from Judge
Parker. See Save Our Cumberland Mountains v. Watt, 550 F. Supp. 979 (D.D.C. 1982).
11Amended Parker Order, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1217, 1217 (D.D.C. 1985).
19Id.

Id. at 1218. The various violations relevant to the AVS include: (1) Federal and
State failure-to-abate cessation orders; (2) unabated Federal and State imminent harm
2
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identifies such persons, or if the AVS indicates that persons with
outstanding violations or unpaid civil penalties have applied for
or received permits, the Amended Parker Order requires OSM
to deny that applicant a permit and to promptly inform the state
regulatory authority, if any. 2l OSM must also request the state
agency to refuse to issue the permit or to revoke the permit, as
the case may be.22
The adoption of the AVS has proved to be a history-making
event in the regulation of surface coal mining in the United
States. OSM has spent in excess of $15 million for in-house and
contractual support in designing and implementing the system
thus far.3 Its regulations to implement the AVS, and its recent
interpretations of those regulations, have sent shock waves
throughout the mining industry. Both environmental and mining
industry groups have filed lawsuits2 out of dissatisfaction with
the system and OSM's regulations for implementing it.21
II.

Tim REGULATIONS

The inability of a violator to get a permit is no doubt an
effective inducement to comply with the requirements of SMCRA.
cessation orders; (3) delinquent civil penalties; (4) bond forfeitures; (5) delinquent abandoned mine reclamation fees; and (6) unabated violations of Federal and State air or
water environmental protection laws, rules or regulations. 30 C.F.R. § 773.15(b)(1).
21 SMCRA § 503, 30 U.S.C. § 1253 allows states with approved surface coal
mining regulatory programs to obtain "primacy." Once a state obtains primacy, the
state agency becomes the regulatory authority and assumes "exclusive jurisdiction over
the regulation of surface coal mining and reclamation operations .... " Id. at § 1253(a).
The state authorities must enforce state surface coal mining statutes and regulations that
are no less effective than the federal regulations. Theoretically, once a state obtains
primacy, OSM's role is reduced to one of oversight to ensure the state programs are
consistent with the federal program. As discussed below, and particularly in Section IV
of this Article, OSM's role in the states' use of the AVS and enforcement of the permitblocking regulations has been significantly more active than is consistent with the notion
of state primacy.
12 Amended Parker Order, 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1217, 1218 (D.D.C. 1985).
" Means, "The Applicant Violator System: A Critical Evaluation", 10 EASTERN
Mn4. L. INsT. 6-1 (1989).
u National Wildlife Federation v. Manuel Lujan, Jr., Nos. 88-3117-BDP, 88-3464BDP, 88-3470-BDP, 89-1130-BDP, 89-1167-BDP, 89-1751-BDP, 89-1181-BDP (D.D.C.
Consolidated). Among the parties to this consolidated action are the National Wildlife
Federation, the Kentucky Resources Council, the National Coal Association and the
American Mining Congress.
23 At the time of this writing cross-motions for summary judgment are pending in
this consolidated action. Not surprisingly, the environmental groups have argued that
OSM's regulations implementing the AVS are not stringent enough, while the industry
groups argue they are overbroad and deprive applicants and permittees of due process
of law.
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If violators are unable to obtain permits to engage in further
mining, they will either be put out of business or they will
become motivated to correct their violations, reclaim their mine
sites and pay their delinquent civil penalties or abandoned mine
land fees.
In attempting to implement the AVS's goal of identifying
and blocking violators and those who control them from obtaining permits, OSM has promulgated three sets of regulations. The
first set of regulations defines "ownership" and "control" for
the purposes of the AVS. 26 These ownership and control regulations have been the biggest source of controversy involved with
the AVS. 27 OSM's second set of regulations revises its existing
regulations to require more detailed information from permit
applicants. 28 The third set of regulations establishes the general
procedures for determining whether a permit was improvidently
issued and for applying what OSM considers the appropriate
remedial measures for suspension and rescission of such permits .29

The AVS focuses primarily on identifying permit applicants
who either own or control a violator or who are owned or
controlled by anyone who owns or controls a violator. The
"ownership" and "control" regulations are, thus, at the heart
of the AVS and the controversy surrounding it. For that reason,
this Article will focus on the ownership and control regulations.
It will attempt to explicate the often convoluted regulations and
examine some of the ramifications of OSM's regulatory definitions of "ownership" and "control".
On October 3, 1988, OSM promulgated the first of the three
sets of regulations to implement the Amended Parker Order.30
These regulations provide that before a permit can be issued,
the regulatory authority must determine whether a violator is
owned or controlled by either the applicant or those who own
or control the applicant.3 Thus, for each permit application,
OSM uses the AVS to look at three separate groups of entities
30 C.F.R. § 773.5; 53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 (1988).
, Means, supra note 23, at 6-1.
54 Fed. Reg. 8,982 (1989).
29 54 Fed. Reg.
18,438 (1988).
" 30 C.F.R. § 773.5 and 30 C.F.R. § 773.15(b); 53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 (1988).
3 30 C.F.R. § 773.15(b). "ITIhe regulatory authority shall not issue the permit if
any surface coal mining and reclamation operation owned or controlled by either the
applicant or by any person who owns or controls the applicant is currently in violation
of the Act or any other law, rule or regulation referred to in this paragraph." Id.
26
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for connections to a violation: 1) the applicant itself; 2) those
entities owned or controlled by the applicant; and 3) any other
entity owned or controlled by those who own or control the
applicant. 32 If any entity in any of those three groups shows a
link to a violator, then the permit will be denied."
The key to determining when an applicant will be permitblocked is the regulatory definition of "owned" and "controlled", as contained in 30 C.F.R. §773.5. Using those definitions the regulatory agency (OSM or a state agency) undertakes
a three part analysis:
(1) Is the applicant a violator?
(2) Does the applicant own or control a violator?
(3) Who owns or controls the applicant, and do any of those
persons or entities own or control a violator?
The terms "owned" or "controlled" and "owns" or "controls"
are broadly defined to mean any one or34a combination of
specified relationships under two categories.
.30 C.F.R. §773.5(a) lists those persons or entities deemed to
have "per se" control or ownership of an operation. Persons or

32

30 C.F.R. § 773.15(b).

33

Id.

-' 30 C.F.R. § 773.5 articulates these ownership and control relationships thus:
For purposes of this subchapter:
Owned or controlled and owns or controls mean any one or a combination
of the relationships specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this definition(a)(1) Being a permittee of a surface coal mining operation; (2) Based on
instruments of ownership or voting securities, owning of record in excess
of 50 percent of any entity; or (3) Having any other relationship which
gives one person authority directly or indirectly to determine the manner
in which an applicant, an operator, or other entity conducts surface coal
mining operations.
(b) The following relationships are presumed to constitute ownership or
control unless a person can demonstrate that the person subject to the
presumption does not in fact have the authority directly or indirectly to
determine the manner in which the relevant surface coal mining operation
is conducted:
(1) Being an officer or director of an entity;
(2) Being the operator of a surface coal mining operation;
(3) Having the ability to commit the financial or real property assets or
working resources of an entity;
(4) Being a general partner in a partnership;
(5) Based on the instruments of ownership or the voting securities of a
corporate entity, owning of record 10 through 50 percent of the entity; or
(6) Owning or controlling coal to be mined by another person under a
lease, sublease or other contract and having the right to receive such coal
after mining or having authority to determine the manner in which that
person or another person conducts a surface coal mining operation.
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entities with these characteristics are irrefutably presumed to own
or control the violator. Even if they do not have such ownership
or control, entities with these relationships are not permitted to
disprove the existence of control. The "per se" categories are:
(1) Being a permittee of a surface coal mining operation,"
or
(2) Based on instruments of ownership or voting securities,
owning of record in excess of 50 percent of an entity 6;
or
(3) Having any other relationship which gives one person
authority directly or indirectly to determine the manner
in which an applicant, an operator, or other entity con7
ducts surface coal mining operations.
The second category consists of relationships which are "presumed" to establish ownership or control.3 8 The applicant has
the burden of rebutting the presumption by demonstrating he or
she does not have the authority directly or indirectly to determine
the manner in which the operation is conducted.3 9 The regulation
contemplates that the person with "presumptive" ownership or
control can rebut the presumption. However, the regulations do
not specifically provide for a hearing on that issue before the
permit is denied.4 The presumptive relationships include:
4
(1) Being an officer or director of an entity; 1
(2) Being the operator of a surface coal mining operation;4 2
(3) Having the ability to commit the financial or real prop43
erty assets or working resources of an entity;
(4) Being a general partner in a partnership;"
(5) Based on the instruments of ownership or the voting
securities of a corporate entity, owning of record 10 to
50 percent of the entity;43 or
(6) Owning or controlling coal to be mined by another person under a lease, sublease or other contract and having

30 C.F.R. § 773.5(a)(1).
Id. at § 773.5(a)(2).
17 Id.
at § 773.5(a)(3).
- Id. at § 773.5(b).
9 Id.; 53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,871.
0 30 C.F.R. § 773.5(b).
4"Id. at § 773.5(b)(1).
2 Id. at § 773.5(b)(2).
43

Id. at 773.5(b)(3).

" Id. at § 773.5(b)(4).
4" Id.
at § 773.5(b)(5).
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the right to receive such coal after mining or having
authority to determine the manner in which the person
or another person conducts a surface coal mining operation .46
In promulgating these regulations and considering the responses of commentators, OSM states it "has concluded that the
definition should not cover all degrees of ownership, but only
those where control exists." 47 It views the purpose of withholding
permits under the AVS as encouraging the correction of violations and the payment of monies owed. 48 OSM insists that the
liability for civil penalties and reclamation work remains "with
the persons who originally incurred the obligation" rather than
the applicant.4 9
OSM's goal in designing these regulations may have been to
reach only those who had actual ownership or control of violators and those who were directly responsible for the violation,
but that has not been the practical effect. OSM chose to use
extremely broad language in defining ownership and control.
These broad definitions ensnare many persons and entities who
in fact do not have ownership and control. At the same time,
the regulations impose a heavy burden on an applicant to overcome the presumption of ownership or control (not to mention
the hardship of being placed in a "per se" category). Because
of the inability to disprove the presumptions prior to the denial
of a permit, the regulations effectively exert enormous leverage
on the applicant to pay civil penalties or undertake reclamation
work that may legally be the obligation of another.
While the regulations do not require the applicant to pay the
violator's fees or fulfill the violator's reclamation obligations,
the applicant will have to do so in order to obtain the mining
permit essential to conducting its business. OSM recognizes the
practical coercive effect of the AVS and its regulations while at

" 30 C.F.R. § 773.5(b)(6).
53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,870.
At 53 Fed. Reg. 38,868, OSM states:
This rule is intended to secure greater compliance with the Act by preventing mining permits from being issued to persons who, either by themselves or through related persons, own or control violators of the Act. By
defining the terms "owns or controls" and "owned or controlled" and by
revising the scope of the compliance review, OSMRE will gain an effective
tool to encourage persons who own or control a violator to ensure that all
violations are abated or are in the process of being abated.
53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38875; see also 53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,885.
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the same time denying that it intends any shifting.to the applicant
of the liability to reclaim or pay fines. In its comments accompanying the ownership and control regulations, OSM states:
The rule does not transfer liability for civil penalties and
reclamation work to the permit applicant. Those responsibilities remain with the persons who originally incurred the obligation. If the commenter intended the term "liability" to mean
that an applicant would be unable to receive a permit until
reclamation is performed and penalties and fees paid, the
commenter is correct. The rule is justified because it is a
powerful means of inducing remedial action in situations where
such action is possible.50
In this passage, OSM candidly admits that the purpose of
the broad "ownership" and "control" definitions is to "induce"
remedial action. What OSM leaves unsaid is that the regulations
will effectively "induce" the applicant, as opposed to the violator, to take the remedial action so it can get a permit and
resume its business.
In some circumstances, the AVS permit block can even extend to past ownership and control relationships that no longer
exist. Even though the applicant (or its owners and controllers)
may have cut all ties to the violator long before the time of the
permit application, the applicant can remain inextricably linked
to the violator in the AVS until all land is reclaimed or fines
are paid. According to OSM's comments accompanying its regulations requiring the revocation of improvidently granted permits:
The dissolution of a partnership will not relieve the partners
of any previously-held responsibility for an unabated violation,
or for a delinquent penalty or fee as owners or controllers of
the partnership. Nor will the expiration or termination of a
mining contract necessarily relieve the parties to the contract
of any previously held responsibility. The dissolution or liquidation of a corporation in bankruptcy will not relieve any
officer, director or other owner or controller of the corporation
of his or her previous responsibility for operations conducted
by, or under the ownership or control of, the corporation."

1053

Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,875 (emphasis added); see also supra note 48.
1, 54 Fed. Reg. 18,438 at 18,446.
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This virtually unending ownership and control liability is particularly unfair and burdensome when the alleged owner or controller no longer has any contact with the person or entity
directly responsible for the violation and may have no power or
ability to correct it.
Following is a closer examination of the relationships OSM
has regulated through its ownership and control regulations implementing the AVS, and some of the potential ramifications of
the designation of those relationships as ones of ownership and
control.
A.

The "Per Se" Category Ramifications

Applicants (or their owners or controllers) who are linked to
2
a violator by a relationship described in the "per se" category
are conclusively presumed to own or control the violator. The
applicant will not be issued a permit to mine anywhere in the
nation until all of the violator's outstanding civil penalties are
paid and/or all property left unreclaimed by the actual violator

is reclaimed .53
One of the more troubling of the "per se" ownership relationships is the "50 percent ownership" category.5 4 Under this
provision, an applicant owning 50 percent or more of a business
is considered to be a "per se" owner or controller of the business. OSM's rationale for creating this category is that a "majority interest will always be a controlling interest." ' 55 However,
in a practical sense, shareholders (particularly shareholders which
are themselves corporations) may have limited managerial functions. The regulations do not clearly distinguish between owners
of voting and non-voting stock. An owner of non-voting stock
(even one who owns 50 percent or more of the equity of a
corporation) has no actual, direct control of the corporation.
Similarly, the regulations do not distinguish between ownership by general and limited partners. Although a limited partner may own 50 percent or more of the partnership, by definition
a limited partner has no management control. Because of the
irrefutable "per se" nature of this category, these "majority"

52

See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.

"

See generally, 53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38869-71.
30 C.F.R. § 773.5(a)(2).
53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,869.

"
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shareholders or limited partners have no right or opportunity to
rebut the ownership presumption by showing a lack of actual
6
control.
The "per se" category that best illustrates the vagueness and
overbreadth of the ownership and control regulations is the final
"catch all" discretionary classification. The regulations call for
a conclusive finding of ownership or control for those "having
any other relationship which gives one person authority directly
or indirectly to determine the manner in which an applicant, an
operator, or any other entity conducts surface coal mining operations."15 7 The regulations provide no guidance to the regulatory authorities or to the industry how this category is to operate.
The regulatory authority is given apparent carte blanche to
determine what relationships come within this category and
whether ownership or control exists. The only criteria or guidance OSM provides in promulgating the rule is that the agency's
determination must be made on a case-by-case basis after examination of the facts."' Among the relationships and facts OSM
suggests may be considered are "informal agreements, personal
relationships, and the mining history of the parties," as well as
the circumstances surrounding a coal mining operation or the
fact that a person has financed the operation, owned the equipment or the rights to the coal, or directed the operation.59
This "guidance" is more than a little ironic. Since this is a
per se ownership category, the applicant is afforded no opportunity for a hearing. The only facts OSM will ever consider are
the ones that led it to its initial conclusion. Interestingly, OSM
acknowledges (in another context) that this kind of information
is not readily available to it. In justifying the shifting of the
burden of proof to the alleged owner or controller who falls
into a presumptive (not "per se") category, OSM states:
The burden of proof properly should rest with those who have
access to the information on which a control determination
can be accurately made-the officers, directors, general partners, operators, those with the ability to commit the financial

"

Id. at 38,870.

30 C.F.R. § 773.5(a)(3); see also 53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,870.
" "Whether a particular relationship provides authority to determine the manner
in which a surface coal mining operation is conducted will be determined on a case-bycase basis after careful examination of the facts." 53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,870.
,953 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,870.
7
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or real property or working resources of an entity, owners of

a ten through fifty percent interest, and owners and lessors of
coal. Neither OSMRE nor regulatory authorities have easy
access to the information which is needed to make an accurate
determination of control in such circumstances, whereas persons subject to the presumptions would have better access to
the information needed to show control does not exist. 60
OSM's logic in finding it does not have access to the necessary
information to prove ownership and control in these situations,
but it can make a determination based on less apparent relationships, such as the mining history of the parties, is questionable
at best.
The propriety of any per se categories of ownership or
control relationships may be questionable in light of the AVS'
high error rate. According to the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) the probability of an incorrect ownership and
control determination being made by the AVS is very high. As
recently as January, 1989, 5 out of the 13 applications reviewed
by the GAO were later reversed upon subsequent manual verification. 6' "Overall, about 46 percent of the system recommendations were reversed." ' 2 With nearly a 50 percent chance that
an applicant will be incorrectly linked to a violator simply because of a system error, it seems unjust to deprive an applicant
of all opportunity for a prior hearing.
The catchall "per se" category of the ownership and control
regulations has been widely criticized as overly broad and as too
inclusive. 63 It would only take a little imagination to encompass
just about anyone under this category. Furthermore, an applicant is left to wonder whether its particular relationship with an
operation will place it in this category. Once the application is
filed, if the applicant falls within this category, that permit and
all future permits are blocked by OSM, and there is no recourse.

6's9 53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,871.
" It is small comfort that OSM has implemented a program of manual checking
of the computer's links between violators and applicants. This simply leaves applicants
at the mercy of the compounded computer and human error.
62 Report of the United States General Accounting Office to the Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House of Representatives, GAO/AFMD Report89-31, Surface Mining - Operation of the Applicant Violator System Can Be Improved.
10 (January 1989), pp. 13-15.
53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38870.
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Assuming the constitutionality of the system is upheld," the
applicant has no process by which to appeal OSM's discretionary
65
conclusion of ownership and control.
B.

The Presumptive Category Ramifications

The "presumptive" ownership or control relationships are
based on OSM's assumption that applicants in those categories
"ordinarily" would be in a position to assert such control over
an operation. 66 Critics of the rebuttable presumptions contend
they are contrary to both established principles of corporate law
and the business realities of control of surface mining opera-

tions .67
Under the first presumptive category, an officer or director
of a violator or of an entity linked to a violator through any
ownership or control relationship would be unable to obtain a
permit.6 Critics argue an individual officer or director may be
incapable of asserting authority because of the collective nature
of the group in question. 69 OSM has taken the position that the
mere fact that control was exercised through group decisions
with no single officer or director able to make decisions does
not rebut the presumption of ownership or control.70 Without
this most logical proof of lack of control, OSM does not explain
how an officer or director can rebut the presumption.
OSM assumes an officer or director will have ready'access
to the materials necessary to rebut such a presumption (whatever
they might be). 7' OSM does not, however, consider the situation
where such information is not available to the officer or director-as when the individual is no longer an officer or director
and has no current connection at all with the violator. OSM's
position also ignores the fact that the opportunity to present
those materials comes after the requested permit is denied. No

The litigation referred to in note 24, supra, and the pending cross-motions for
summary judgment, involve several constitutional challenges to the AVS and its implementing regulations.
See generally, 53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,869-71.
53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,871.
'Id.

30 C.F.R. § 773.5(b)(1).
53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,871-38,872.
"s9 "A person, such as a director, cannot escape responsibility merely by asserting
that he or she is a member of a group, and the group, collectively, can exercise authority,
but not any one individual." 53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,872.
1153 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,872.
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consideration is given to the hardship the applicant incurs in the
interim, not to mention its burden and expense of disproving
the presumption.
The "operator" of a surface coal mine on which there is a
violation is presumed to own or control the entity which caused
the violation.72 Unlike a permittee which is conclusively liable
for all violations which occur on the permit, 7 an operator is
only presumptively liable. According to OSM, an operator of a
surface mine is liable only for its own conduct and can rebut
the presumption by showing the violation was caused by someone else. 74 This focus on causation and whether the operator's
conduct caused the violation is inconsistent with OSM's comments relating to officers and directors. Officers and directors
cannot rebut their presumptive control by showing they did not
cause the violation. OSM fails to explain why it should be
otherwise for operators. Such internal inconsistencies raise serious questions about the basic fairness of the ownership and
control regulations.
Without much discussion, OSM indicates in its comments
that it considers the category "operator" to include more than
just entities that remove the coal. 7 The authority OSM cites for
this broadened scope of the meaning of "operator" is United
States v. Rapoca Energy Co. (Rapoca).7 6 Thus, there is considerable uncertainty as to precisely who can be tapped as an
operator under this regulation.
Anyone "having the ability to commit the financial or real
property assets or working resources of an entity is presumed to
own or control the entity" under these regulations.7 7 Like the
catch-all "per se" category, this category gives the regulatory

,230 C.F.R. § 773.5(b)(2); see also 53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,873.
7330 C.F.R. § 773.5(a)(1).
74 "Although
permittees are responsible for everything that happens on the site,
non-permittee operators are responsible only for their own conduct. Thus an operator
may be able to show that a violation was caused by the permittee or someone else other
than itself." 53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,873.
71 "Further, courts have construed operators to include entities which do not
physically engage in coal removal ....Thus, although OSMRE agrees that entities
physically engaged in surface coal mining operations will almost universally control such
operations, the term operator includes more than such entities." 53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at
38,873 (citation omitted).
16613 F. Supp. 1161 (D.C. Va. 1985). For an extensive discussion of this case,
see infra text accompanying notes 93-96.
" 30 C.F.R. §773.5(b)(3); see also 53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,873.
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agency extremely wide discretion in determining what relationships can be included.
This category is so broad that control could even be imputed
to financial lending institutions under certain circumstances.78 A
lending agreement which requires approval of the financial institution to use borrowed funds for certain purposes or to move
or commit equipment or other resources held as collateral could
cause a financial institution to run afoul of the AVS. While
being unable to get a mining permit might not adversely affect
a lending institution itself, it could have an impact on the
institution's officers, directors, and others who "own" or "control" the institution. It could also affect other mining industry
customers of the institution who may find that they are owned
or controlled by the tainted financial institution through similar
financing arrangements.
Being a general partner in a partnership is another presumptive category. 79 Like the presumption regarding officers and directors, this category ignores the fact that a single partner often
cannot make operational decisions. As one of several partners
all of whom have equal votes, an individual partner usually has
no control of the partnership within the ordinary meaning of
the word. Once again OSM asserts the ability of a partner to
avail itself of all the potential means of rebuttal as a remedy for
the overinclusiveness of the category.80 However, OSM has said
proof that one is part of a group that can act only by majority
vote is insufficient. Nor can one rebut the presumption by showing he or she attempted to correct the violation but could not
8
get the violator to cooperate or agree to an abatement plan. '
OSM has thus left a partner with few, if any, apparent ways to
rebut the presumption of ownership and control. At best, it is
exceedingly unclear how a partner can make a successful rebuttal.
Under the regulations, ownership or voting rights of 10 to
50 percent of the securities of record of a corporate entity creates
7

For example, under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation

and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9657, lender liability for cleanup costs
of hazardous waste has been found to stem from liability attached to the "current owner

and operator" of the facility or the "owner or operator at the time of disposal." See
U.S. v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1554 (1990).
30 C.F.R. § 773.5(b)(4); see also 53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,873.
53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,873-38,874.
54 Fed. Reg. 18,438 at 18,450.
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a presumption of ownership or control. 8 2 0 SM asserts this provision is in line with decisions which have found that actual
control of a corporation is possible even when the shareholder
owns less than the majority of the voting stock.8 3 The cases OSM
cites84 provide little support for the rule it adopts.
In Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 5 relied on by OSM,
the court concluded that, under the circumstance of that case,
an owner of 23 percent of General Motors' stock had "control"
within the meaning of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. However,
the court based that decision on the fact that the remaining 77
86
percent of the stock was widely dispersed among many owners.
It appears such considerations of the ownership of the remaining
shares also played a role in the court's decision in Securities and
Exchange Commission v. R.A. Holman & Co..87
A presumption of ownership or control based on as little as
10 percent ownership, without any consideration of the ownership of the remaining shares, is not supported by these cases.
Moreover, ownership of 10 percent of a corporation is by definition not majority ownership, and under normal circumstances
would not give the shareholder actual control. This presumption
has attracted much criticism. In large part it is criticized because
it makes a presumptive rule out of a very exceptional corporate
88
circumstance, and it requires the applicant to prove otherwise.
This provision raises another problem which is related more
to OSM's interpretation and implementation of the regulation
than to its actual wording. OSM has indicated it will apply the
10 to 50 percent ownership and control presumption "in determining whether control exists between indirectly related corporate entities" and "at each level of a corporate structure."8' 9
OSM gives this illustration of the effect of application at
each level of a chain:

30 C.F.R. § 773.5(b)(5); see also 53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,873-38,874.
53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,873.
'
Securities and Exchange Commission v. R.A. Holman & Co., 377 F.2d 665, 667
(2d. Cir. 1967); Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 279 F. Supp. 361, 368 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
"
279 F. Supp. 361, 368-369 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
"I have come to the conclusion that duPont, by riason of its 23% stock interest
in General Motors, had the power to control that corporation because of the unrelated
ownership of the balance of the shares." Id. at 368.
- 377 F.2d 665, 666-667 (2d. Cir. 1967).
I 53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,874.
nId.
"
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For example, if Company "A" owns a forty-five percent interest in Company "B" and Company "B" owns a twenty
percent interest in Company "C" (the applicant), then Company "A" will be presumed to own or control the applicant,
even though Company "A" has an indirect interest in the
applicant of only 9 percent. The determining factor is not the
percentage owned, but whether control exists. In such an example, if Company "A" owned or controlled Company "D"
which had a violation, the applicant will not be issued a permit
unless it submits evidence proving that it is not controlled by
Company "B", Company "B" is not controlled by Company
"A", Company "A" does not own or control Company "D",
or Company "D" is not a violator.9
The diagram below illustrates just how tenuous a connection
this presumption would call ownership or control.
A

A owns 1067 of D

D (violator)

Aowns 45% of B
A indirectly
owns9%oC

B
C

owns 20o of C
(Applicant)

Although Applicant C may have neither direct contact nor
any ownership or control relationship with Violator D, Applicant
C is still permit blocked because of its remote, indirect nine
percent ownership by A which owns or controls the violator.
While adopting ten percent ownership as a bright line indicator
of ownership or control, OSM reserves the ability to find such
a relationship for an entity owning even less than ten percent
through the "per se" category of "other relationships" discussed

earlier. 9'
The last presumptive classification is based upon the "ownership" or "control" of coal to be mined by another person
under a lease, sublease or other contract. This liability is also
based on having the right to receive such coal after mining or
having the authority to determine the manner in which the
surface coal mining operation is conducted. 92 OSM bases this

90Id.
91 Id.

- 30 C.F.R. § 773.5(b)(6) establishes a presumption of ownership and control
from:
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provision on its conclusion that "in contract mining operations,
the owner or lessor of the coal more often than not is controlling
the mining operation even though the owner or lessor of the
coal purportedly employs 'independent contractors'." 93
OSM's sole support for this presumption which violates the
most basic precepts and definitions of contract and employment
law is the decision in Rapoca.94 A review of the Rapoca opinion
shows it provides little support for OSM's disregard of longestablished principles of employment and contract law.
First, the Rapoca decision is a district court decision which,
at this writing, has not been adopted by any state or federal
appellate court. Moreover, the Rapoca court did not purport to
establish a general rule or presumption relating to the relationship between a lessor and lessee or between the parties to a
contract mining agreement. Rather, the Rapoca decision is based
solely on, and limited to, its circumstances.
Rapoca did not even directly involve issues of ownership or
control or an attempt to define those relationships. Rather, it
dealt only with liability for payment of reclamation fees. The
issue was whether Rapoca Energy Company (Rapoca Energy) or
the contract miners which actually severed the coal in question
were responsible for payment of reclamation fees. Section 402
of the Surface Mining Control Reclamation Act of 1977, 30
U.S.C. § 1232(a) (1982) requires that "operators" of coal mining
operations pay a reclamation fee based on the number of tons
mined.
The Act defines "operator" at 30 U.S.C. § 1291(13) as "any
person, partnership, or corporation engaged in coal mining who
removes or intends to remove more than two hundred and fifty
tons of coal from the earth by coal mining within twelve consecutive calendar months in any one location." 9' The issue, then,
was whether Rapoca Energy was an operator within the meaining
of the Act so as to incur liability for the reclamation fee. Based
on the singular circumstances of Rapoca Energy's relationship
with its contract miners, the Court determined it was so liable.

Owning or controlling coal to be mined by another person under a lease,
sublease or other contract and having the right to receive such coal after
mining or having the authority to determine the manner in which that
person or another person conducts a surface coal mining operation.
93 53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,877.
94 Rapoca, 613 F. Supp. 1161 (D.C. Va. 1985).
30 U.S.C. § 1291(13) (1982).

1990-9 1]

APPLICANT VIOLATOR SYSTEM

Instead of focusing on whether Rapoca Energy was involved
in the removal of coal so as to come within the Act's definition
of "operator", the Rapoca court turned to state law principles
of agency under the laws of Virginia and West Virginia. Based
on the extensive participation and control of Rapoca Energy
over the activities of its contract miners, the Court determined
Rapoca Energy's contract miners were not independent contractors, but were merely agents of Rapoca Energy.96
The Rapoca court also inexplicably focused on the fact that
Rapoca Energy's contract miners were not permitted to sell the
coal on their own behalf. Rather, they were required to deliver
the coal to Rapoca Energy at a specified location and received
a flat per-ton fee for mining the coal. Without explanation, the
court determined that Rapoca's continued ownership of the coal
and the contract miners' inability to sell it as they chose negated
the existence of an independent contractor relationship.
Where [sic] the relationship that of owner and independent
contractor, the mining companies would undoubtedly be free
to sell to whomever would pay the highest price, with only a
royalty per ton of coal mined or percentage of the sale price
being remitted to Rapoca. 97
The status of an independent contractor is not predicated
upon the ability to dispose of or sell the final product. Rather,
it is based primarily upon the relationship between the parties
and the extent to which the independent contractor conducts its
affairs without the day-to-day oversight or guidance of the per98
son or entity for whom it performs services.
- The court based its decision upon the specific facts of Rapoca Energy's relationship with its contract miners. It recounted those facts thus:
Rapoca surveys its mineral holdings to determine what locations are suitable
for coal mining operations. It then performs all preliminary engineering
work for the site, including the engineering work required for a surface
mining permit. In addition, Rapoca begins the actual site development
work, which includes building or improving access roads, constructing
sedimentation ponds, and facing up the coal seam.
During the course of the mining operations, Rapoca provides all engineering and mapping services for the contractors. The contractors follow Rapoca's engineers' directions relative to the placement and method of driving
entries, the pulling of mine pillars, the location and use of haulings inside
the mines, and any other matter pertaining to the protection of the mine
and the securing of the greatest amount of coal possible.
Rapoca, 613 F. Supp. at 1164.
w Id.
" Glenn v. Beard, 141 F.2d 376, (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied 323 U.S. 724, reh'g
denied, 324 U.S. 889 (1944); Sturgill v. Barnes, 300 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1957).
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OSM's presumptive category of ownership and control relationships founded on lease or contract mining relationships is
directly modeled on the Rapoca decision. Its response to that
criticism is that "those who have reputations for operating in
compliance with the laws shall have few problems." 99 Thus,
OSM generalizes what is essentially a singular situation into a
presumption which must be rebutted by each and every person
or entity coming within its broad scope. Because one company's
relationship with its contract miners led one court to find a
relationship of control, OSM extends a presumption of control
to all mining agreements. The Rapoca decision itself provides
no basis for such a generalization.
OSM concedes this category (which would include all operations conducted by contract miners) may negatively affect those
operations. Neither the regulations nor OSM elaborate how having a "good reputation" will prevent an applicant from being
permit-blocked and having its business disrupted if the AVS
links the applicant to a violator.
Nor can the parties to a contract mining agreement rely on
its terms to define their relationship. OSM has taken the position
that although the agreement may establish the rights of the
parties among themselves, it does not define their relationship
for purposes of the AVS.1°0
The effects of this classification can be devastating to a lessor
or one who has contracted with a contract miner which is
somehow tied to a violation.' 0 ' As a practical matter, the lessor
must become the guarantor of the contract miner's compliance
with all state and federal mining laws and regulations. Although
the regulations do not require a lessor to abate a contract miner's
violations, the lessor will have to pay to remedy the errors of
the lessee or contract miner in order to obtain any permit on
that or any other tract of land. Similarly, all other lessees of
that tainted lessor with similar relationships will be blocked.
This cost could be financially disastrous to a lessor who finds
itself the victim of a lessee's operations.
Equally as problematic as OSM's definitions of ownership
and control are its stated intentions regarding its interpretation
" 53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,878.
"The terms of a contract may establish the rights of the parties among themselves, but are not a conclusive determination of the responsibility of the parties under
the Act." 53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,877.
10,
A case in point is the experience of Island Creek Coal Company which is
discussed below in Section IV of this Article.
"0
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and application of the definitions. Both the regulation itself1 2
and OSM's comments'0 3 indicate OSM intends to make ownership and control determinations based on one or a combination
of the relationships set out in the regulations.
This piggy-backing of ownership and control relationships
can result in a permit block based on a very tenuous string of
relationships which leave the applicant very far removed from,
and often in practical terms a stranger to, the violator. For
example, if the applicant, Company A, has a contract mining
agreement with B who owns 10 percent of Company C which
has one director who is also a partner in a partnership that owns
minerals that are leased to a lessee who has an unabated violation, Company A would be permit-blocked under OSM's regulations. Schematically, this chain of relationships would look
like this:
Company A (Applicant)
(contract mining agreement)
Contract Miner B
(B owns 10% of Company C)
Company C
Director
(Director is a partner in Partnership)
Partnership
(Partnership leases mineral to Lessee)
Lessee (Violator)
While it is not certain that OSM would attempt to enforce the
regulations in this manner, there is nothing in the regulations or
OSM's comments to prevent it from doing so.
OSM has also declared its intention to track ownership and
control relationships up and down the corporate chain.1° This
means that a violation tied to one subsidiary or even to an
02 30 C.F.R. § 773.5.
10Where two entities are indirectly related, control is established using any

appropriate combination of the relationships specified in the definition,
including the presumptions in paragraph (b). For instance, a director of a
parent company is presumed to control wholly owned subsidiaries of the
parent company using the combination of the relationships specified in
paragraphs (b)(l) and (a)(2).
53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,869.
,o OSM "will track ownership up and down a corporate chain so long as control
is present." 53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,875.
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officer or director of that subsidiary can cause the parent and
all other subsidiaries to be permit-blocked. In the context of
directors, this could lead to the following results. If A is a
director of both corporation X and corporation Y, and corporation Y shows up in the AVS as a violator, corporation X will
be permit blocked because of its ownership and control link to
the violator through director A. Moreover, if A was director of
the violator at the time of the violation, corporation X will be
permit blocked even if A is not a director of the violator at the
time of the application. 0 5
Successor liability can also become an issue under the AVS.
OSM has taken the position that a parent corporation which
acquires a subsidiary with violations becomes the owner and
controller of a violator and is thus permit-blocked. 10A further
ramification of this rule is that all of the parent corporation's
other subsidiaries would also be permit-blocked. Under the regulations, the other subsidiaries would be presumed to be owned
or controlled by the parent which owns or controls a violator.
Whether OSM will impose successor liability upon one who
acquires only the assets of a violator is less clear. OSM seems
to take the position that the purchase of assets directly related
to the violation would cause successor liability. In other situations, apparently OSM would allow the parties to allocate liability for the violation by contract.1°7
When a company acquires only assets of an entity, its responsibilities will depend upon a number of factors. For instance,
if the assets purchased include the mine site and equipment
where outstanding violations exist, the acquiring company would
be responsible for the violations under the theory that the
acquiring company has purchased the liabilities in connection
with the transferred assets of the other entity and that the
purchase price for the entity would reflect any liabilities trans-

"The determining factors under final § 773.15(b)(1) are: (I) Whether the common officer was in control of the violator at the time the violation occurred and is
therefore responsible for the violation; or (2) whether the common officer presently
controls the violator and, therefore, can order abatement." 53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at
38,876.
'0 "OSMRE concludes that it is reasonable and proper to hold an acquiring
company liable for the violations for which a subsidiary was responsible prior to its
acquisition in a number of circumstances." 53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,876.
107

Id.
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ferred. In other instances, assets may be transferred without
transferring responsibility for violations. '0
If the liability is to remain with the seller, OSM requires the
document of transfer to clearly so state.1 9 Even if the parties
do clearly evidence an intention to leave liability with the seller
of the assets, OSM's comments indicate it will review the transaction and make its own determination where the liability rests." 0
Thus, one acquiring the assets of an entity with an ownership
or control link to a violator is left in a quandary as to who will
ultimately bear the liability under the AVS. Since the result could
be a permit-block of the purchaser or new parent company (and
all of the parent's other subsidiaries), the penalty for an incorrect
guess where OSM will place the liability is extremely severe.
III.

CHALLENGING AN OWNERSHIP DETERMINATION

No formal procedures have yet been established for challenging OSM's permit-blocking decision prior to the denial of
the permit application. OSM relies on informal procedures, including verification of permit blocking recommendations by a
central Applicant Violator System Clearing House."' Should a
link be disclosed by a check, OSM is to send a notice to the
permit applicant with a warning that the relationship in question
would cause a permit to be withheld unless the violation is
abated, is in the process of being abated, or unless the permit
applicant can demonstrate that the "requisite ownership and
control relationships between the owners and controllers of the
applicant and the violator [did] not exist. ' " 2 Although the regulations imply the applicant may then submit evidence to make
the required showings, they do not actually provide for such a
procedure."3 The regulations only specifically require a hearing
when the regulatory agency denies a permit because of a pattern
4
of violations."
If the informal administrative review process is unsuccessful,
the applicant may seek review of the agency's denial. If the

10 Id.
109Id.
110 Id.
2
"
"'

53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,878-79.
53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,879.
30 C.F.R. § 773.15(b)(1)(ii).
Id. at § 773.15(b)(3).
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permit is a federal permit, the applicant may file a request for
review of OSM's decision at the Interior Department office of
Hearings and Appeals." Temporary relief is effectively unavailtemporary relief from a
able since OSM's regulations prohibit
6
decision not to issue a permit."
Where the state regulatory authority makes the decision to
deny the permit application, OSM has indicated that the permit
applicant may petition the state regulatory authority for review
of the permit denial." 7 However, OSM will review the state's
decision, and if not satisfied, it will challenge it. OSM has
virtually admitted that primacy is of little or no concern in the
realm of the AVS. Indeed, a resolution of the AVS permit block
with the state may be only a prelude to further protracted review
and negotiations with OSM on the same matter." 8 Moreover,
OSM prohibits a state from deciding an applicant's challenge to
determinations that federal violations exist or that monies are
owed to the federal government and further requires such challenges to be resolved in a federal forum."19 Thus, if the violator
has both state and federal violations on record, even at the
initial stages an applicant may be facing battle on two fronts
simultaneously.
As noted above, neither the regulations nor OSM's comments
provide much enlightenment as to what evidence will rebut the
various presumptions of ownership or control.' 20 OSM does say
that the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence.' 2'
However, this seemingly concrete standard is undercut by other
statements by OSM. In its discussion of its reasons for not
adopting standards or guidelines for rebutting the presumptions,
Is

See 43 C.F.R. § 4.1360.

Id. at §§ 4.1367, 4.1377(a). However, in a recent case, The Pittston Company
and Clinchfield Coal Company obtained an injunction when OSM attempted to permitblock them because of unpaid fines of a contract miner. The Pittston Co. and Clinchfield
Coal Co. v. Lujan, CA 91-0006-A (D.W. Va. 1991). The plaintiffs argued that due
process prevented them from being bound by DSM's action against the contract miner
since the plaintiffs were not parties to that action.
53' Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,879.
"
See Section IV of this Article (OSM refused to remove Island Creek Coal
Company from the AVS after requested to do so by the state).
9 3 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,879.
I" See generally, 53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,879-38,880 (standards for rebutting
presumptions).
I "The measure of proof needed to rebut a presumption under this rule is a
preponderance of the evidence, the standard ordinarily required in civil matters." 53
Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,879.
116
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OSM states, "the proof needed to rebut the presumptions will
be determined case-by-case."'a
OSM then goes on to totally repudiate the preponderance
standard and to articulate a kind of "sliding scale" standard of
proof.
The factual requirements for rebutting a presumption will
change depending on the particular situation. For instance, the
amount of proof required to rebut a presumption of control
for a chief executive officer will likely be greater than that for
a junior vice-president of a corporation. Likewise, the amount
and kind of proof would vary where different presumptions
23
apply.1
Permit applicants are left with no intelligible standard of
proof for rebutting the presumptions of ownership and control.
It is not hard to see why the coal industry has become so
frustrated with the system. While time passes and costs escalate,
a permit applicant must speculate what type of information
would suffice to rebut a presumption of ownership or control
to the satisfaction of the regulatory agency-if the opportunity
for rebuttal is available at all.
IV.

AN

OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL CASE IN POINT-ISLAND
CREEK COAL COMPANY

Because OSM's ownership and control regulations are of
fairly recent vintage, there are few examples of OSM's interpretation and implementation of them to assist the industry in
anticipating their effect. One available example, however, is the
experience of Island Creek Coal Company which has been widely
reported in various industry publications.124
Some months prior to July, 1990, Island Creek Coal Company (Island Creek) requested a modification to its refuse area
Permit Number 713-5002 as part of an ongoing operation. By
July, 1990, Island Creek anticipated that it would be granted
53 Fed. Reg. 38,868 at 38,880.
Id. (Emphasis added).
,24 McPhee, Coping with @*! OSM, 16 Ky. COAL J. 1 (Oct. 1990); McGraw,
Getting Caught in the A VS Net, 16 Ky. COAL J. 4 (Oct. 1990); Kentucky Bars Island
Creek, 14 COAL OUTLOOK 1 (July 30, 1990); Island Creek Alters Contractor "Control"
Issue, 14 COAL OUTLOOK 2 (Sept. 28,1990); Island Creek Submits Control List to
Agencies, 14 COAL OUTLOOK 3 (Dec. 3, 1990).
121
12
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very shortly.' 25 By letter dated July 5, 1990 Island Creek was
informed by the Kentucky National Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet (the "Cabinet") that Island Creek was
permit-blocked because of a bond forfeiture by a former contract
miner. 26 The permit block applied not just to Island Creek but
also to its directors and officers27 and any shareholders with an
interest of 10 percent or more.'
This letter was the first official notice Island Creek had of
any problems on the Price Coal operation. According to the
Cabinet, Price Coal had failed to reclaim a site it was mining
under a contract with Island Creek. Price Coal's reclamation
bond was forfeited in late 1988, but Island Creek was not
notified of it until the permit block notice on July 1990-at least
a year and a half later. Island Creek notified the Cabinet that
it wanted to appeal the violation and requested the Cabinet to
grant it conditional permits pending the appeal. The Cabinet
pointed out that the statute of limitation had run on Price Coal's
forfeiture, so no appeal was possible. Because the violation could
not be appealed (even though Island Creek had just learned of
it), the Cabinet would not agree to grant conditional permits. 128
In the world of the AVS, it seems an "owner" and "controller"
has fewer rights and gets less due process than the violator it
supposedly owns or controls.

I" Complaint, Island Creek Coal Corp. v. Kentucky Natural Resources & Envtl.
Protection Cabinet, No. 90-CI-976 (Pike Cir. Ct. filed July 19, 1990).
1"I Letter from Lawrence E. Grash, Deputy Commissioner of the National Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet to Mr. S.O. Ogden of Island Creek Coal
Company (July 5, 1990) (text of letter discussing permit block against Island Creek Coal
Company). The letter reads:
This is to inform you that effective the date of this letter, Island Creek
Coal Company, its directors and officers, plus any stockholders holding
ten percent or more of voting stock are permit blocked under KRS 350.085.
These blocks have been initiated through entry into the Federal Applicant
Violator System and Kentucky Surface Mining Information System.
The reason for this block is a bond forfeiture on Price Coal Company,
Permit Number 498-5319. Our investigation of the outstanding cessation
orders on Price Coal has found a contract that clearly defines a control
relationship over Price Coal by Island Creek.
We would be happy to discuss reclamation of this site as well as resolution
of outstanding penalties at your convenience.
127 Id.
' Conversations between Chauncey S.R. Curtz and E. Wayne Busconi, Corporate
Counsel, and Gerald McPhee, Director of Government Relations for Island Creek Coal
Company, and between Karen J. Greenwell and Mr. McPhee.
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Island Creek requested a formal hearing with the Cabinet
pursuant to 405 KAR 7:090(1) to contest the Cabinet's determination that Island Creek owned or controlled its contract
miner, Price Coal. Island Creek again requested it be granted
conditional permits pursuant to 405 KAR 8:010(13)(4)(b) pending
the outcome of the hearing on the ownership and control determination. The Cabinet refused to conditionally issue any permits
or revisions. 29
In an attempt to obtain interim relief, Island Creek filed an
action in Pike Circuit Court. 30 In that action, Island Creek
requested a preliminary injunction requiring the removal of the
permit-block and a preliminary injunction that the Cabinet conditionally issue its pending permit revision. A hearing was held
on Island Creek's request for preliminary injunction.' 3' Before
the court ruled on the motion, Island Creek began negotiations
with the Cabinet regarding an abatement plan for the Price Coal
mine site.
After substantial negotiations, the Cabinet and Island Creek
arrived at an abatement plan satisfactory to the state authority.
Based on those negotiations and eventual agreement, Island
Creek, in effect, withdrew its motion. The Cabinet agreed to
remove Island Creek from the state's version of the AVS (the
Surface Mining Information System or SMIS) and requested that
OSM remove Island Creek from the AVS. However, OSM refused, and the Cabinet declined to grant Island Creek's pending
permit revision under those circumstances. 32 Thus, Island Creek's
settlement with the state authority was not the end of its ordeal,
and Kentucky's primacy under the Act was of no practical
33
effect. ,
Since a settlement with the Kentucky regulatory authority
did not resolve Island Creek's permit block, Island Creek began
negations afresh with OSM. After extensive negotiations, Island
Creek and OSM finally arrived at a settlement agreement. Pursuant to that agreement, Island Creek has identified all of its
contract miners as well as all sites upon which they have

Complaint, supra note 125, at 2-3.
See Complaint, supra note 125.
See Record, Island Creek Coal Corp. v. Kentucky Natural Resources & Envtl.
Protection Cabinet, No. 90-CI-976 (Pike Cir. Ct. filed July 19, 1990).
"3 See supra note 128.
,3 See, e.g., SMCRA § 503, 30 U.S.C. § 1253.
'12
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worked. 3 4 Island Creek and the Cabinet must now negotiate on
a case-by-case basis as to any needed reclamation on any of the
sites. If an agreement is not reached on any site (or, presumably,
if OSM does not approve the agreement), Island Creek will face
the possibility of being permit-blocked again. State Cabinet officials have indicated it will use the Island Creek settlement as
the model for future negotiations and settlements with permit35
blocked applicants.
The ownership and control regulations and OSM's comments
on them purport to allow primacy to remain with the states and
to allow the states to run their own versions of the AVS. Nevertheless, OSM actually directs the states in the permit-blocking
process through memoranda of understanding with the states
and the use of the federal AVS. Even if a state removes the
name of an alleged owner and controller from its own system,
OSM can leave the alleged owner and controller on the federal
system, effectively preventing the applicant from receiving a
permit in any state. Obviously, the resolution of any permit
block will involve OSM, and OSM must be satisfied before the
matter can be resolved.
Island Creek's case illustrates the problem of obtaining a
hearing to contest an ownership or control determination. The
Kentucky regulations do not provide for a hearing prior to the
denial of the permit. 3 6 Like Island Creek, a company with a
pending permit may receive notice it is permit-blocked, but be
unable to obtain a hearing to challenge the decision until the
Cabinet actually denies the permit because of the link to a
violator. The problem with waiting until the permit is denied
and then challenging the control through the administrative process is the amount of time such a procedure can take. While the
months go by, and the alleged owner and controller's operations
are brought to a standstill, the pressure grows to negotiate with
the state and OSM and to assume the liability, even though it
may not be warranted.
CONCLUSION

In principle, an Applicant Violator System could be an effective tool for enforcing SMCRA. However, the implementation
1
'"
3

See Island Creek Submits Control List to Agencies, supra note 124.
See supra note 128.
405 Ky. ADmIN REOs. 7 (1990); 405 Ky. ADNt. REos. 8 (1990).
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and definitional make-up of the AVS has opened a Pandora's
Box of problems for the mining industry as well as the regulatory
agencies. Under OSM's definitions of "ownership" and "control", just about anyone can be deemed an "owner" or "controller" of a mining operation. Efforts within the definitional
regulations themselves to distinguish non-owners/controllers are
woefully inconsistent. The result of an incorrect determination
of ownership or control could be financially disastrous for the
innocent person who as a practical matter neither owned nor
controlled a mining operation which has violated the Act.
This article is but an overview of one of three sets of regulations implementing the AVS. Additional regulations are now
being prepared by OSM. It is clear that we are far from seeing
the final chapter of the "ownership and control" regulatory
battle.

